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Abstract 39 
What role does non-genetic inheritance play in evolution? In recent work we have 40 
independently and collectively argued that the existence and scope of non-genetic 41 
inheritance systems, including epigenetic inheritance, niche construction/ecological 42 
inheritance, and cultural inheritance - alongside certain other theory revisions - 43 
necessitates an extension to the neo-Darwinian Modern Synthesis (MS) in the form of an 44 
Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). However, this argument has been challenged on 45 
the grounds that non-genetic inheritance systems are exclusively proximate mechanisms 46 
that serve the ultimate function of calibrating organisms to stochastic environments. In 47 
this paper we defend our claims, pointing out that critics of the EES (i) conflate non-48 
genetic inheritance with early 20th century notions of soft inheritance; (ii) misunderstand 49 
the nature of the EES in relation to the MS; (iii) confuse individual phenotypic plasticity 50 
with trans-generational non-genetic inheritance; (iv) fail to address the extensive 51 
theoretical and empirical literature which shows that non-genetic inheritance can generate 52 
novel targets for selection, create new genetic equilibria that would not exist in the 53 
absence of non-genetic inheritance, and generate phenotypic variation that is independent 54 
of genetic variation; (v) artificially limit ultimate explanations for traits to gene-based 55 
selection, which is unsatisfactory for phenotypic traits that originate and spread via non-56 
genetic inheritance systems; and (vi) fail to provide an explanation for biological 57 
organisation. We conclude by noting ways in which we feel that an overly gene-centric 58 
theory of evolution is hindering progress in biology and other sciences. 59 
Keywords: biological organisation, cultural evolution, epigenetic inheritance, Extended 60 
Evolutionary Synthesis, Modern Synthesis, niche construction, non-genetic inheritance 61 
62 
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1. Introduction 62 
What role does non-genetic inheritance play in evolution? By ‘non-genetic inheritance’ 63 
we mean the transmission of information across multiple generations of individuals 64 
through a mechanism other than DNA replication, such as cultural inheritance via social 65 
learning (e.g. imitation or language), epigenetic inheritance via epigenetic marks (e.g. 66 
methylation patterns of genes), or ecological/niche inheritance via the environment. In 67 
previous work (Danchin et al. 2011; Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Odling Smee et al. 2003; 68 
Pigliucci and Müller 2010), we have argued that the existence and scope of non-genetic 69 
inheritance across a range of taxa - together with findings in evo-devo and other 70 
disciplines - requires a radical revision of the Modern Synthesis (Huxley 1942) 71 
(henceforth MS; also known as Neo-Darwinism), in which evolution is defined as 72 
changes in gene frequencies resulting from genetic drift, mutation, gene flow and natural 73 
selection of genes. We have called instead for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis 74 
(Pigliucci and Müller 2010) (henceforth EES), in which phenotypic change and 75 
adaptation can result from both genetic and non-genetic inheritance (Danchin et al. 2011; 76 
Danchin and Wagner 2010; see also Bonduriansky and Day 2009; Mameli 2004). 77 
 78 
Our calls have not gone unchallenged. We focus here on perhaps the most explicit 79 
critique of our work by T. Dickins and colleagues (Dickins and Barton in press; Dickins 80 
and Dickins 2007; Dickins and Dickins 2008; Dickins and Rahman 2012; Scott-Phillips 81 
et al. 2011), although similar criticisms have been made by others (Dawkins 2004; Haig 82 
2007). Dickins and colleagues’ argument, which they apply equally to humans (Scott-83 
Phillips et al. 2011) and non-human species (Dickins and Rahman 2012), is that non-84 
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genetic inheritance systems are exclusively proximate mechanisms that evolved for the 85 
ultimate function of calibrating organisms to environmental stochasticity. They maintain 86 
that ultimate ‘why’ questions – questions concerning why particular traits are favoured, 87 
and the existence of adaptations that exhibit apparent design – can only be answered at 88 
the level of natural selection acting on genetic variation. Consequently, they argue that 89 
the existence of non-genetic inheritance “poses no challenge to the explanatory and 90 
conceptual resources of the MS, which are sufficient” (Dickins and Rahman 2012, 91 
p.2913). Furthermore, by allegedly confusing proximate and ultimate causes in this way, 92 
we are charged with “hinder[ing] scientific progress” (Scott-Phillips et al. 2011, p.39) by 93 
perpetuating confusion and causing wasted effort. 94 
 95 
In this commentary we seek to clarify and defend our position. For ease of exposition we 96 
focus our response on the most recent and most explicit critique of the EES published by 97 
Dickins and Rahman (2012, henceforth D&R). We first clarify the status of the EES in 98 
relation to the MS. We then show that D&R fail to address the fundamental point that 99 
transgenerational non-genetic inheritance can significantly transform evolutionary 100 
dynamics by generating novel targets for selection, affecting the rate and manner of 101 
information transmission across generations, and creating new genetic equilibria that 102 
would not exist in the absence of non-genetic inheritance. We then argue that D&R’s use 103 
of the ‘ultimate-proximate’ distinction is unhelpful and unproductive in this debate, and 104 
that the EES is necessary to fully understand biological organisation. We conclude by 105 
defending our work against the charge that it is hindering scientific progress. 106 
 107 
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2. Scope and status of the EES 108 
What exactly are we claiming when we argue that the MS needs to be extended? D&R, 109 
like other critics, relate the EES to the early 20th century notion of ‘soft inheritance’. This 110 
term, which they attribute to Mayr, is defined by D&R as “the inheritance of variations 111 
that are the result of non-genetic effects” (D&R, p.2913). This is incorrect. In fact, Mayr 112 
defined soft inheritance as “the belief in a gradual change of the genetic material itself, 113 
either by use or disuse, or by some internal progressive tendencies, or through the direct 114 
effect of the environment” (Mayr and Provine 1980, p.15). Soft inheritance, as originally 115 
defined by Mayr, therefore involves direct changes to DNA sequences. In contrast, the 116 
non-genetic inheritance systems that we argue are evolutionarily important, such as 117 
epigenetic inheritance or cultural transmission, do not involve direct changes in DNA 118 
sequences. There is no suggestion, for example, that culturally transmitted religious 119 
beliefs change DNA sequences. Epigenetic inheritance (like cultural transmission) is 120 
defined as change that occurs independently of changes in the DNA sequence. The issue 121 
of directed changes to DNA is a separate and fascinating issue (Shapiro 2011), but is 122 
logically distinct to non-genetic inheritance. To reiterate, the contemporary debate over 123 
the role of non-genetic inheritance in evolution is not the same as the rejection of soft 124 
inheritance prior to the MS (Bonduriansky 2012), and it is unhelpful to conflate the two. 125 
 126 
Another source of confusion is over the status of the EES in relation to the MS. D&R 127 
distinguish between ‘general’ evolutionary theory, which “captures the basic Darwinian 128 
dynamics of variation, inheritance, competition and selection” (D&R, p.2915) but is 129 
mechanism-neutral with respect to how these dynamics operate, and ‘special’ theories 130 
! 7 
such as the MS, which specifies mechanisms by which, for example, variation arises 131 
(undirected genetic mutation and recombination) and inheritance occurs (Mendelian 132 
genetic inheritance)1. D&R argue that the EES is a general theory and hence cannot 133 
challenge the MS.!This is again mistaken: the EES is intended as a special theory that 134 
extends and replaces the MS. We have argued (Danchin et al. 2011; Jablonka and Lamb 135 
2005; Odling Smee et al. 2003; Pigliucci and Müller 2010) that the specialized 136 
assumptions of the MS, such as, natural selection, recombination and undirected genetic 137 
mutation, are not sufficient to explain the adaptive dynamics of evolution, and must be 138 
expanded to include a suite of additional developmental, epigenetic, behavioural and 139 
cultural processes. To argue that the EES fails to challenge the MS because it is “not the 140 
same order of account as that of the MS” (D&R, p.2915) is incorrect. 141 
 142 
3. Is non-genetic inheritance just a proximate calibration mechanism? 143 
D&R’s central argument is that non-genetic inheritance functions to calibrate organisms 144 
to environmental stochasticity, thus remaining under ultimate genetic control. In support 145 
of this notion of ‘genetic control’ they cite human twin studies purporting to show the 146 
heritability of epigenetic marks, and discuss two examples in rats, one in which maternal 147 
licking of pups alters those pups’ subsequent parental behaviour and stress responses via 148 
epigenetic changes in offspring neural circuits (Champagne 2008), and another involving 149 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"! We note that while D&R attribute the distinction between general and specific 
evolutionary theories to Webb (2011), it is much older. Lewontin (1970), for example, 
clearly spelled out the general aspects of Darwinian evolution (variation, inheritance and 
differential fitness), and explained how genetic evolution is but one specific theory that 
fulfills these criteria. It is curious that Webb (2011) cites no references in his paper, 
neither Lewontin (1970) nor any of the large subsequent literature that has built on 
Lewontin’s distinction.  
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learning biases such that rats are more likely to associate nausea with tastes rather than 150 
other sensory stimuli (the ‘Garcia effect’: Garcia et al. 1955). 151 
 152 
There are several problems with this argument. First, D&R repeatedly conflate non-153 
inherited individual phenotypic plasticity with transgenerational phenotypic plasticity that 154 
is transmitted to subsequent generations via non-genetic inheritance, and thus fail to 155 
address our arguments for the importance of the latter in driving evolutionary dynamics. 156 
Phenotypic plasticity occurs when phenotypes vary in response to environmental 157 
variability in the absence of corresponding DNA variation, and such direct proximate 158 
responses may entail epigenetic or individual learning mechanisms. Non-genetic 159 
inheritance, in contrast, occurs when variable information that is unrelated to DNA 160 
sequence variation is transmitted across successive generations of individuals, such as 161 
occurs with epigenetic inheritance and cultural transmission / social learning. D&R fail to 162 
recognise this distinction. Taste aversion in rats, for example, concerns individual 163 
phenotypic plasticity, with individual rats’ food preferences shifting, within genetically 164 
specified limits, in response to foods experienced within their lifetimes. There is no trans-165 
generational inheritance in this example as D&R present it, therefore it has no bearing on 166 
the EES debate. Furthermore, D&R appear to then conflate cultural transmission and 167 
individual learning in general (“even cultural learning processes are situated within 168 
individuals”, D&R, p.2918), seemingly subsuming all cultural learning/transmission into 169 
individual learning. This entirely misses the point, and is empirically untenable: 170 
individual learning alone cannot lead to transgenerational cultural inheritance, and there 171 
is extensive evidence that cultural transmission can drive behavioural distributions away 172 
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from individual preferences (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Galef and Laland 2005; Mery et 173 
al. 2009), including taste preferences in rats (Laland and Plotkin 1990). Cultural 174 
transmission is observed across a diverse range of species (Galef and Laland 2005), and 175 
in humans allows the accumulation of vast amounts of information over successive 176 
generations independently of genetic variation (Richerson and Boyd 2005). 177 
 178 
A similar point can be made for epigenetic inheritance. Contrary to D&R’s claim that 179 
“the potential for epigenetic transgenerational inheritance appears limited” (p.2916), there 180 
is abundant and accruing evidence for chromatin- or RNA-mediated cellular inheritance 181 
of epigenetic variations over multiple generations, independent of DNA variation 182 
(Jablonka 2012; Jablonka and Raz 2009). The most extensive studies have been 183 
conducted in plants (Schmitz et al. 2011), and similar transgenerational effects have been 184 
documented in nematodes, yeast, insects and recently mammals (Jablonka 2012; Jablonka 185 
and Raz 2009). Compared to these breeding experiments, the human twin studies cited by 186 
D&R are only an indirect means of assessing the degree to which epigenetic variation 187 
matches genetic variation, yet even they demonstrate that, to quote what D&R themselves 188 
describe as the largest study to date, “epigenetic profiles are not fully determined by 189 
DNA sequence” (Kaminsky et al. 2009, p.242). While it is trivially true that the 190 
mechanisms underlying epigenetic inheritance and cultural transmission must be 191 
genetically influenced (just as it is trivially true that the mechanisms of the MS, such as 192 
DNA replication or recombination via meiosis, are genetically influenced), this often 193 
diffuse influence is a long way from the complete genetic control portrayed by D&R.  194 
 195 
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Turning back to D&R’s argument, the notion that individual phenotypic plasticity (e.g. 196 
individual learning or epigenetic variation) functions to calibrate organisms to stochastic 197 
environments is interesting, but not new. Campbell (1960) and Lorenz (1969) discussed 198 
learning in these terms decades ago, and since then numerous formal models have 199 
explored how phenotypic plasticity can evolve in response to varying rates and forms of 200 
environmental stochasticity, for both epigenetic (Lachmann and Jablonka 1996) and 201 
learning processes (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Aoki et al. 2005). These models indicate 202 
that epigenetic or learning-based phenotypic plasticity can readily evolve when 203 
environments change too rapidly for genetic evolution to track directly, that is, when 204 
environments change within an individual’s lifetime (what Lorenz (1969) called 205 
‘generational deadtime’) or slightly longer, such that natural selection acting over 206 
multiple generations cannot adequately respond. 207 
 208 
Yet D&R do not appreciate the main implication of this notion of calibration for their 209 
argument about genetic control. If the function of phenotypic plasticity is to track 210 
environmental change that cannot be anticipated by genes, then there simply must be a 211 
partial decoupling between genes and phenotypic plasticity, otherwise the latter would 212 
never have evolved. This applies even more to transgenerational non-genetic inheritance. 213 
Once information can be inherited non-genetically, it can significantly transform 214 
evolutionary dynamics through reciprocal feedback between the different inheritance 215 
systems. This goes far beyond mere proximate ‘calibration’. Gene-culture coevolution is 216 
the best-understood example, having been subject to formal theoretical modelling for 217 
nearly 40 years (since Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1973). D&R are incorrect to say that 218 
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these studies “model cultural change as if it were directly tied to genetic variation” 219 
(D&R, p.2917); phenotypes are modelled as the product of both genetic and cultural 220 
inheritance, which are assumed to be at least partially independent (yet interacting). 221 
These models show that cultural inheritance can modify selection contexts and drive 222 
genetic evolution to new stable equilibria that would not have existed in the absence of 223 
cultural inheritance (Laland et al. 2010; Boyd and Richerson 1985). Evidence from 224 
molecular genetics and archaeology supports these predictions in several cases, such as 225 
the spread of lactose tolerance alleles in populations that possess culturally transmitted 226 
dairy farming practices or the spread of sickle cell alleles in response to increased malaria 227 
from culturally transmitted yam cultivation (Laland et al. 2010). Gene-culture 228 
coevolution is not just restricted to agriculture-related change. Laland, Kumm and 229 
Feldman (1995) showed that culturally transmitted practices such as female-biased 230 
infanticide and female-biased abortion can significantly and permanently alter the 231 
genetically-specified primary sex ratio, while Mesoudi and Laland (2007) showed that 232 
culturally transmitted beliefs in partible paternity (that children can have more than one 233 
‘biological’ father, as is commonly believed in many traditional South American 234 
societies) can drive human mating systems to different equilibria compared to the purely 235 
genetic evolution of human mating behaviour. Recent models suggest similar 236 
coevolutionary dynamics between genetic and epigenetic inheritance (Day and 237 
Bonduriansky 2011), and models that have incorporated epigenetic inheritance into 238 
classical population genetic models show that the dynamics of populations are profoundly 239 
influenced by heritable epigenetic variations (Geoghegan and Spencer 2011). The process 240 
of niche construction (Odling Smee et al. 2003), whereby organisms modify their 241 
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selective environments, adds further complexity by transforming selection acting on 242 
descendant populations. The “stochastic environment” discussed by D&R is not a fixed, 243 
external entity to which genetic evolution adapts populations, it itself constitutes an 244 
inheritance system (ecological inheritance) that can generate novel, consistent and 245 
directional selection on genes. D&R completely ignore this extensive theoretical and 246 
empirical literature on the interaction between multiple inheritance systems. 247 
 248 
4. Beyond “genetic=ultimate, non-genetic=proximate” 249 
At the heart of the disagreement, we think, is D&R’s dogmatic insistence that ultimate 250 
“why” questions can only be answered in terms of the natural selection of genes, with 251 
everything ontogenetic treated as solely a proximately causal process (see also Scott-252 
Phillips et al. 2011; Dickins and Barton in press). While this may have been a useful 253 
heuristic at the formation of the MS in the context of debates over soft inheritance 254 
(which, as noted above, is quite different to non-genetic inheritance), the weight of 255 
evidence for the causal role of non-genetic inheritance in evolution now invalidates the 256 
simple equating of ‘ultimate causation=gene-based selection’, and strongly implies 257 
reciprocal causation rather than the unidirectional causality assumed by D&R (Laland et 258 
al. 2011). The question “why do different human groups vary in their genetic propensity 259 
to drink milk”, for example, seems impossible to answer without appealing to culturally 260 
transmitted farming practices. It is difficult to see the latter as merely “proximate” given 261 
that cultural evolution is driving changes in gene frequencies (Laland et al. 2010; 262 
Gerbault et al. 2011). Researchers cannot simply take the selection pressures on adult 263 
lactose absorption alleles as a given, pre-established and fixed feature of the environment, 264 
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as they are changing dynamically as the cultural practice and favoured genotype 265 
coevolve. Or to take another example, the question “why do people in England 266 
predominantly speak English, and people in France mostly speak French?” seems 267 
impossible to answer in terms of changes in gene frequencies, given that linguistic 268 
variation is independent of genetic variation (there are no genes for speaking French, for 269 
example). Instead, this question would have to be addressed in terms of the cultural 270 
evolution and diversification of the Indo-European language family over the last few 271 
thousand years through cultural equivalents of mutation (copying errors) and selection 272 
(see Pagel 2009), as well as sociolinguistic processes that have no obvious parallel in 273 
genetic evolution (see Labov 2001), and which can be addressed using similar 274 
phylogenetic methods to those used to reconstruct genetic evolutionary relationships (e.g. 275 
Gray and Atkinson 2003; Bouckaert et al. 2012). This type of question is not limited to 276 
humans, of course, and one could ask similar questions about why, say, one population of 277 
great tits know how to break the foil of milk bottle caps and another population does not 278 
(Lefebvre 1995), or why one population of chimpanzees uses tools to crack nuts and 279 
another does not (Whiten et al. 1999), both of which are best explained as cultural 280 
variation resulting from cultural transmission rather than genetic variation resulting from 281 
genetic inheritance2. One might label these cultural dynamics as all ‘proximate’, as 282 
Dickins and Barton (in press) do, but they surely concern ultimate ‘why’ questions: why 283 
particular phenotypic traits (e.g. drinking cows’ milk, speaking English, nut-cracking) 284 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#!Natural selection can also act on cultural or epigenetic variation, such as when 
differential birth rates affect the spread of different religions (Hout et al. 2001) or 
epigenetic variants that promote tameness are selected during domestication, as suggested 
by artificial selection experiments in silver foxes (Jablonka and Raz 2009). !
! 14 
emerge and spread amongst different populations, and the appearance of complex design 285 
features3. In the case of language, it is increasingly recognised that cultural transmission 286 
can generate in language complex design features (the cultural equivalent of adaptation in 287 
biological evolution; see Kirby, Cornish and Smith 2008), something that the proximate-288 
ultimate causation distinction hinders researchers from appreciating (Laland et al. 2011). 289 
By abandoning an artificial ‘ultimate=genetic’ definition, such cultural dynamics can be 290 
appropriately seen as drivers of phenotypic variation. The same applies to 291 
developmentally-induced, epigenetically inherited variation and niche-constructed 292 
environments. 293 
 294 
5. Biological organisation 295 
We find curious D&R’s argument that “advocates of the EES consistently fail to 296 
understand biological organization and its provenance” (p.2917). In our view, the MS 297 
was founded on tenets that, while useful heuristics for advancing biological theory at that 298 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$!Dickins and Barton (in press) maintain that all such cultural dynamics (such as language 
change) should be seen as proximate rather than ultimate causes. They equate cultural 
evolution with ‘historical accounts’, which “are not in any sense default ultimate 
accounts”, because (i) historical/cultural dynamics are governed by ultimate genetic 
causes at some higher level of organisation, and (ii) there is no adequately worked-out 
theory of cultural evolution that provides an equivalent level of explanatory power to 
genetic evolution. We disagree. Regarding point (ii), decades of empirical and theoretical 
work in cultural evolution has identified numerous learning biases that can explain 
specific behavioural patterns (Mesoudi 2011; Richerson and Boyd 2005), including 
frequency-dependent (e.g. conformist or anti-conformist) biases and model-based biases 
such as prestige or success bias. Regarding point (i), as we argued in section 3, the fact 
that cultural learning biases may have a genetic origin does not imply that the behaviour 
that results from cultural dynamics is under direct genetic control. Hence our claim that 
these cultural dynamics are often more appropriately seen as ultimate, rather than (or as 
well as) proximate, causes of behaviour. !
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time, are now known to be anachronistic. These tenets include the legitimacy of 299 
neglecting developmental processes thereby allowing evolution to be studied through 300 
population genetics alone, and a focus on a single level of ultimate causation. These 301 
tenets fail to fully address biological organization, and the EES arose precisely in 302 
response to this deficiency. All of the key components of the EES (evo-devo, epigenetics, 303 
multilevel selection, niche construction, cultural evolution, etc.) address the issue of 304 
interaction between levels of organization as well as the origin and fixation of specific 305 
forms of organization at each of these levels, from the genetic to the cultural (see, for 306 
example, Müller (2007) for evo-devo, Odling-Smee et al. (2003) for niche construction, 307 
or Boyd & Richerson (1985) for gene-culture coevolution). Such work emphasises key 308 
concepts such as modularity (Müller 2007) or nested hierarchies of inheritance systems 309 
(Odling Smee et al. 2003) that are entirely absent in the MS. If the problem of 310 
organization is phrased in the characteristic manner of the MS, i.e. reducing organization 311 
to the coordinating function of genes, it is not surprising that critics such as D&R are 312 
disappointed by the EES. But this bypasses the true features of complex phenotypic 313 
organization in organismal evolution. We argue, in contrast, that it is the EES that 314 
concentrates on the provenance of organization, by including the comprehensive 315 
organizing properties of development, inheritance, behaviour, and culture. 316 
 317 
6. Progress in the evolutionary sciences 318 
We believe that an exclusive focus on gene-based selection as the sole ultimate cause of 319 
evolutionary design is hindering progress in the evolutionary sciences. Incorporating non-320 
genetic inheritance into heritability studies can potentially solve the so-called ‘missing-321 
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heritability’ problem (Danchin et al. 2011; Furrow et al. 2011), and explain the spread of 322 
novel alleles and maladaptive behaviour (Laland et al. 2010). The human behavioural and 323 
social sciences, in particular, have been highly critical of gene-based approaches to the 324 
study of human behaviour such as sociobiology or, more recently, evolutionary 325 
psychology (Layton 2010; Kendal 2012). This is largely because the phenomena that 326 
social/behavioural scientists study - the cultural dynamics of languages, technology, 327 
religious beliefs, socio-political institutions and so on - are not under direct genetic 328 
control, and can only be explained as cultural adaptations that arise through cultural 329 
evolution (Mesoudi 2011; Boyd et al. 2011). Similarly, a gene-based approach may not 330 
be appropriate in medical research on supposedly genetic human neurological disorders 331 
such as epilepsy or autism, as the inclusive heritability of such disorders may incorporate 332 
significant non-genetic components (Ben-Ari and Spitzer 2010; Ben-Ari 2008; Furrow et 333 
al. 2011). An evolutionary theory that encompasses multiple interacting inheritance 334 
systems and the interactions between them is far more compatible with socio-cultural 335 
phenomena, in both humans and non-human species alike, than a gene-centric 336 
evolutionary theory (Danchin et al. 2004; Layton 2010; Kendal 2012). We encourage 337 
D&R, and evolutionary biologists in general, to abandon the dogma of the MS and adopt 338 
a more nuanced, multifaceted theory of evolution. 339 
 340 
REFERENCES 341 
Aoki K, Wakano JY, Feldman MW (2005) The emergence of social learning in a 342 
temporally changing environment: A theoretical model. Curr Anthropol 46:334-340 343 
! 17 
Ben-Ari Y (2008) Neuro-archaeology: Pre-symptomatic architecture and signature of 344 
neurological disorders. Trends Neurosci 31:626-636 345 
Ben-Ari Y, Spitzer NC (2010) Phenotypic checkpoints regulate neuronal development. 346 
Trends Neurosci 33:485-492 347 
Bonduriansky R (2012) Rethinking heredity, again. Trends Ecol Evol 27:330-336 348 
Bonduriansky R, Day T (2009) Nongenetic inheritance and its evolutionary implications. 349 
Ann Rev Ecol Evol Syst 40:103-125 350 
Bouckaert R, Lemey P, Dunn M, Greenhill SJ, Alekseyenko AV, Drummond AJ, Gray 351 
RD, Suchard MA, Atkinson QD (2012) Mapping the origins and expansion of the 352 
Indo-European language family. Science 337:957-960 353 
Boyd R, Richerson PJ (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. University of 354 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL 355 
Boyd R, Richerson PJ, Henrich J (2011) The cultural niche: Why social learning is 356 
essential for human adaptation. PNAS 108:10918-10925 357 
Campbell DT (1960) Blind variation and selective retentions in creative thought as in 358 
other knowledge processes. Psychol Rev 67:380-400 359 
Cavalli-Sforza LL, Feldman MW (1973) Cultural versus biological inheritance: 360 
phenotypic transmission from parents to children. Am J Hum Genet 25:618-637 361 
! 18 
Champagne FA (2008) Epigenetic mechanisms and the transgenerational effects of 362 
maternal care. Front Neuroendocrin 29:386-397 363 
Danchin E, Charmantier A, Champagne FA, Mesoudi A, Pujol B, Blanchet S (2011) 364 
Beyond DNA: integrating inclusive inheritance into an extended theory of evolution. 365 
Nature Rev Genet 12:475-486 366 
Danchin E, Giraldeau LA, Valone TJ, Wagner RH (2004) Public information: From nosy 367 
neighbors to cultural evolution. Science 305:487-491 368 
Danchin D, Wagner RH (2010) Inclusive heritability: Combining genetic and non-genetic 369 
information to study animal behavior and culture. Oikos 119:210-218 370 
Dawkins R (2004) Extended phenotype–but not too extended. A reply to Laland, Turner 371 
and Jablonka. Biol Phil 19:377-396 372 
Day T, Bonduriansky R (2011) A unified approach to the evolutionary consequences of 373 
genetic and nongenetic inheritance. Am Nat 178:E18-E36 374 
Dickins TE, Barton RA (in press) Reciprocal causation and the proximate-ultimate 375 
distinction. Biol Phil. 376 
Dickins TE, Dickins BJA (2007) Designed calibration: Naturally selected flexibility, not 377 
non-genetic inheritance. Behav Brain Sci 30:368-369 378 
Dickins TE, Dickins BJA (2008) Mother Nature’s tolerant ways: why non-genetic 379 
inheritance has nothing to do with evolution. New Ideas Psychol 26:41-54 380 
! 19 
Dickins TE, Rahman Q (2012) The extended evolutionary synthesis and the role of soft 381 
inheritance in evolution. Proc R Soc B 279:2913-2921 382 
Furrow RE, Christiansen FB, Feldman MW (2011) Environment-sensitive epigenetics 383 
and the heritability of complex diseases. Genetics 189:1377-1387 384 
Galef BG, Laland KN (2005) Social learning in animals: Empirical studies and 385 
theoretical models. BioScience 55:489-499 386 
Garcia J, Kimeldorf DJ, Koelling RA (1955) Conditioned aversion to saccharin resulting 387 
from exposure to gamma radiation. Science 122:157-158 388 
Geoghegan JL, Spencer HG (2012) Population-epigenetic models of selection. Theor 389 
Popul Biol 81:232-242 390 
Gerbault P, Liebert A, Itan Y, Powell A, Currat M, Burger J, Swallow DM, Thomas MG 391 
(2011) Evolution of lactase persistence: an example of human niche construction. Phil 392 
Trans R Soc B 366:863-877 393 
Gray RD, Atkinson QD (2003) Language-tree divergence times support the Anatolian 394 
theory of Indo-European origin. Nature 426:435-439 395 
Haig D (2007) Weismann rules! OK? Epigenetics and the Lamarckian temptation. Biol 396 
Phil 22:415-428 397 
Hout M, Greeley A, Wilde MJ (2001) The demographic imperative in religious change in 398 
the United States. Am J Sociol 107:468-500 399 
! 20 
Huxley JS (1942) Evolution, the modern synthesis. Allen & Unwin, London 400 
Jablonka E (2012) Epigenetic inheritance and plasticity: The responsive germline. Prog 401 
Biophys Mol Biol 402 
Jablonka E, Lamb MJ (2005) Evolution in four dimensions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 403 
Jablonka E, Raz G (2009) Transgenerational epigenetic inheritance: prevalence, 404 
mechanisms, and implications for the study of heredity and evolution. Q Rev Biol 405 
84:131-176 406 
Kaminsky ZA, Tang T, Wang SC, Ptak C, Oh GHT, Wong AHC, Feldcamp LA, Virtanen 407 
C, Halfvarson J, Tysk C (2009) DNA methylation profiles in monozygotic and 408 
dizygotic twins. Nature Genet 41:240-245 409 
Kendal JR (2012) Cultural niche construction and human learning environments: 410 
investigating sociocultural perspectives. Biol Theor 6:241-250 411 
Kirby S, Cornish H, Smith K (2008) Cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory: An 412 
experimental approach to the origins of structure in human language. PNAS 413 
105:10681-10686 414 
Labov W (2001) Principles of linguistic change (II): Social factors. Blackwell, Malden, 415 
MA 416 
Lachmann M, Jablonka E (1996) The inheritance of phenotypes: an adaptation to 417 
fluctuating environments. J Theor Biol 181:1-9 418 
! 21 
Laland KN, Kumm J, Feldman MW (1995) Gene-culture coevolutionary theory. Curr 419 
Anthropol 36:131-156 420 
Laland KN, Odling-Smee J, Myles S (2010) How culture shaped the human genome: 421 
bringing genetics and the human sciences together. Nature Rev Genet 11:137-148 422 
Laland KN, Plotkin HC (1990) Social learning and social transmission of foraging 423 
information in Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus). Anim Learn Behav 18:246-251 424 
Laland KN, Sterelny K, Odling-Smee J, Hoppitt W, Uller T (2011) Cause and effect in 425 
biology revisited: Is Mayr's proximate-ultimate dichotomy still useful? Science 426 
334:1512-1516 427 
Layton R (2010) Why social scientists don't like Darwin and what can be done about it. J 428 
Evol Psychol 8:139-152 429 
Lefebvre L (1995) The opening of milk bottles by birds: Evidence for accelerating 430 
learning rates, but against the wave-of-advance model of cultural transmission. Behav 431 
Process 34:43-53 432 
Lewontin RC (1970) The units of selection. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 1:1-18. 433 
Lorenz K (1969) Innate bases of learning. In: Pribram K (ed) On the biology of learning. 434 
Harcourt, New York, pp 13-91 435 
Mameli M (2004) Nongenetic selection and nongenetic inheritance. Brit J Phil Sci 55:35-436 
71 437 
! 22 
Mayr E, Provine W (eds) (1980) The evolutionary synthesis. Harvard University Press, 438 
Cambridge, MA 439 
Mery F, Varela SAM, Danchin E, Blanchet S, Parejo D, Coolen I, Wagner RH (2009) 440 
Public versus personal information for mate copying in an invertebrate. Current 441 
Biology 19:730-734 442 
Mesoudi A (2011) Cultural evolution: How Darwinian theory can explain human culture 443 
and synthesize the social sciences. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL 444 
Mesoudi A, Laland KN (2007) Culturally transmitted paternity beliefs and the evolution 445 
of human mating behaviour. Proc R Soc B 274:1273-1278 446 
Müller GB (2007) Evo-devo: extending the evolutionary synthesis. Nature Rev Genet 447 
8:943-949 448 
Odling Smee FJ, Laland KN, Feldman M (2003) Niche construction. Princeton 449 
University Press, Princeton, NJ 450 
Pagel M (2009) Human language as a culturally transmitted replicator. Nature Rev Genet 451 
10:405-415 452 
Pigliucci M, Müller GB (2010) Evolution: the extended synthesis. MIT Press, 453 
Cambridge, MA 454 
Richerson PJ, Boyd R (2005) Not by genes alone. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 455 
! 23 
Schmitz RJ, Schultz MD, Lewsey MG, O'Malley RC, Urich MA, Libiger O, Schork NJ, 456 
Ecker JR (2011) Transgenerational epigenetic instability is a source of novel 457 
methylation variants. Science 334:369-373 458 
Scott-Phillips TC, Dickins TE, West SA (2011) Evolutionary theory and the ultimate–459 
proximate distinction in the human behavioral sciences. Perspect Psychol Sci 6:38-47 460 
Shapiro JA (2011) Evolution: a view from the 21st century. FTPress Science. 461 
Whiten A, Goodall J, McGrew WC, Nishida T, Reynolds V, Sugiyama Y, Tutin CEG, 462 
Wrangham RW, Boesch C (1999) Cultures in chimpanzees. Nature 399:682-685 463 
